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Human error and its contribution to occupational accidents and incidents has received 
considerable research attention in recent years.  However, more research is needed into the 
validity, practicality, and functionality of using data-driven accident/incident analysis methods to 
identify factors that contribute to incidents with the greatest frequency.  This paper presents a 
case-study of one such method: Human Performance Reliability (HPR).  Methods: The authors 
conducted approximately 30 HPR reviews to analyze incidents that occurred at a large refining 
company over a three year period.  Through the HPR process, the authors identified the most 
common human errors, other contributing factors, and the controls (SOPs, processes, programs) 
that failed to prevent the accidents/incidents.  Results: A Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit test and 
post-hoc analysis of Standard Residuals on the human error frequencies revealed the most 
common human errors and contributing factors, while raw frequency counts showed the most 
commonly associated controls (see Tables 3-6).  The Chi-Square statistic was X2 = 528.58, 
indicating that certain errors were contributing to incidents significantly more often than others.  
Discussion: Early evidence supports the notion that the HPR process is an effective tool for 




The concept of human error and its contribution to occupational accidents and incidents has 
received considerable research attention in recent years. As mechanical systems become safer 
and more reliable, human error is more frequently being identified as the root cause of or a 
contributing factor to an incident (Health and Safety Executive, 1999). When an 
accident/incident occurs, investigation and analysis of the human error that led to the incident 
reveals vulnerabilities in an organization’s management system.  
This concept is illustrated by James Reason’s well-known “Swiss Cheese” model of incident 
causation (see Figure 1). Unfortunately, most organizations have a finite number of resources 
(financial, time, and knowledge) that can be used to address the identified vulnerabilities. That 
makes the ability to identify the most frequent human errors and the most problematic controls 
(e.g., SOPs, safety programs, PPE) very valuable. Being able to do so allows an organization to 
focus its limited resources on the corrective action(s) that are most likely to have the biggest 
impact on the organization’s incident rate.  
This paper describes one method for identifying the most frequent human errors and most 
problematic controls, and presents a case study wherein the method was applied to a large 
petroleum refining company. 
Human Error 
While research related to human error in occupational settings has accelerated in recent years, 
the concept was already being explored almost a century ago. In 1919, Greenwood and Woods 
introduced research demonstrating that certain individuals were more accident-prone than others. 
In other words, Greenwood and Woods (1919) posited that accident-proneness is an immutable 
personality characteristic as stable and reliable as, for example, extraversion or 
conscientiousness. Their conclusions were embraced by industry for decades, and common 
practice throughout this time was to 
terminate employees involved in 
accidents (since they were deemed 
accident-prone) rather than 
acknowledging and addressing system 
flaws (e.g. poorly written procedures, 
lack of engineered controls, poor 
management and supervisory 
practices) that made human error 
likely or even inevitable (Armitage, 
2009).   
The concept of accident-proneness as 
a personality trait was challenged in 
1974 when James Reason tried and failed to replicate the findings of Greenwood and Woods 
(Armitage, 2009). As a result, Reason began to theorize that incident occurrence was due to a 
combination of internal personality factors and external environmental circumstances (Reason, 
1974; Armitage, 2009). Reason’s failure to replicate Greenwood and Woods’ results was 
confirmed by Lawton and Parker (1998), who also pointed out that Greenwood and Woods’ 
reliance on very old and very young research subjects may have contributed to their anomalous 
results. The paradigm shift resulting from Reason’s findings in 1974 gradually made examining 
the system factors after an incident more popular and blaming the worker involved in the 
incident less commonplace. 
During the early 1970s, models of human error began to focus more on cognitive factors, 
including the inherent limitations of human ability. It was during this era that Rasmussen and 
Jensen (1974) proposed a model of human error that divided human performance into three 
separate levels: skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based.  
Figure 1: Swiss Cheese Model 
• Skill-based tasks are those that require pre-packaged, clearly applicable actions 
(Rasmussen & Jensen, 1974; Armitage, 2009).  
• Rule-based tasks differ from skill-based in that the entire action is not pre-packaged, but 
general heuristics apply that can make the task easier and more efficient.  
• Knowledge-based tasks are completely novel situations in which the individual must 
uncover a solution or best course of action without the benefit of prior experience—
accordingly, they are the most susceptible to human error (Rasmussen & Jensen, 1974; 
Armitage, 2009).  
The primary utility of this model is the ability to determine potential novel situations that would 
require knowledge-based solutions, then train workers in the proper course of action so that the 
task becomes rule- or skill-based. An example would be conducting emergency drills so workers 
know the proper response if and when a true emergency happens. 
Contrary to Rasmussen and Jensen’s model of human error, Norman (1988) focused on the 
characteristics of the error itself rather than the task. According to Norman (1988), there are 
three types of human errors: slips, lapses, and mistakes. All three of these error types would later 
be described by Reason as ‘active errors’ (Reason, 1997).  
• A mistake is characterized by an improper judgment in selecting either the objective itself 
or the process of fulfilling the objective (Armitage, 2009).  
• Lapses are typically memory failures where the individual fails to remember to perform a 
complete action or portions of that action (Armitage, 2009; Norman, 1988).  
• Slips are execution errors, where the individual fails to carry out the action as planned 
(Armitage, 2009).  
Very often, slips involve a failure due to automation, whereby the individual is so familiar with a 
task that he/she does not pay close enough attention to its execution and makes an error 
(Armitage, 2009). For that reason, experts are more likely to experience slips, while 
inexperienced individuals are more likely to experience lapses and mistakes (Armitage, 2009). 
Other common types of slips include description errors, associated activation errors, and loss of 
activation errors (Armitage, 2009). 
The discussion of human error up to this point has focused only on true errors: an individual 
intends to do the right thing but fails to do so. Or, as Reason defines it, “the failure of a planned 
action to be completed as intended—without the intervention of some unforeseeable event; or the 
use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim” (Reason, 1990, p.9). Another category of actions—
violations—are often included in discussions of human error, even though some have argued that 
they are not errors. According to Armitage (2009), a violation represents a deliberate or 
intentional deviation from rules or standard operating procedures. Violations may result from 
cognitive factors, personal motives (Ajzen, 1991), or organizational motives (Reason, Parker, & 
Lawton, 2001), but any negative consequences that result from the violation are almost always 
unintended (Parker & Lawton, 2003).  
Violations are typically subcategorized into routine, situational, or exceptional violations (Health 
& Safety Executive, 1999).   
• Routine violations are deliberate deviations from the rules that are done continuously due 
to lack of enforcement from supervisors and/or management, desire to save time, and/or 
the individual’s perception that existing rules are too restrictive (Health & Safety 
Executive, 1999).  
• Situational violations involve deliberate deviations that are strongly 
encouraged/reinforced by environmental conditions, such as operational pressure, 
insufficient staff, or inappropriate physical design of the workplace (Health & Safety 
Executive, 1999).  
• Exceptional violations are large deviations from standard procedures done in unusual 
circumstances, such as in a crisis situation (Health & Safety Executive, 1999). 
Some have argued that the above conceptualizations are overly simplistic. For example, Perrow 
(1984) has argued that complex systems, such as refineries or chemical plants, facilitate 
organizational accidents by virtue of their complexity. Also, Dekker (2006) has argued that the 
Swiss Cheese model, in particular, is too simplistic and conceptualizes incidents as 
linear/sequential, rather than dynamic, interdependent, and complex. Additionally, the above 
conceptualizations of error have focused mainly on the operator level, and mostly ignore the 
contributions of supervisory factors and organizational influences—what Reason might call 
latent conditions (Health and Safety Executive, n.d.). Finally, with the modern emphasis on ‘big 
data’, the above conceptualizations of error are of limited practical utility when analyzing 
incidents or human error, in general, for common trends and patterns.  
Two types of processes have arisen in response to the need for practical data analysis related to 
human error: (1) Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods and (2) more robust models of 
accident/incident investigation. 
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Methods 
HRA methods are risk assessment tools designed to determine the relative probability that a 
human error will occur during a certain process (Cuschieri & Tang, 2010). The final probability 
assessment is affected by many factors, including the quality of the equipment/machinery in the 
process, the human/machine interface, and the temporary and stable characteristics of the process 
operator (Cuschieri & Tang, 2010). Cuschieri and Tang (2010) propose that HRA methods fall 
into three categories: subjective, probabilistic HRA; depend HRA; and HRA based on cognitive 
control theory. Kim and Bishu (2006) also proposed three broad categories, but identified them 
as task-based analysis, response time-based analysis, and expert knowledge-based analysis (see 
Table 1 for definitions of all these concepts).   
Some of the most common examples of HRA will be briefly described below. Potential 
limitations of these HRA methods is that they are time-consuming, require extensive expertise, 
and do not offer guidance on which processes to select for review. Many large organizations with 
PSM-covered processes have thousands of processes and procedures and limited resources to 
conduct detailed process analysis like HRA. Therefore, the ability to identify the most 
problematic procedures and processes for which HRA should be conducted would be valuable to 
these organizations. 
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) 
The Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) was first developed for the nuclear 
power industry by Swain & Gutman in the 1960s (Swain & Guttmann, 1983). The steps involved 
in THERP are as follows: 
“(1) Define the system failures of interest. These pertain to system functions that may 
be influenced by human errors and for which error probabilities are to be 
estimated. 
(2) List and analyze the related human operations. […] 
(3) Estimate the relevant error probabilities. 
(4) Estimate the effects of human errors on the system failure events. This step 
usually involves integration of the HRA with a system reliability analysis. 
(5) Recommend changes to the system and recalculate the system failure 
probabilities” (Swain & Guttman, 1983, p. 5-3). 
 
Table 1: Definitions of HRA categories 






Process is broken into its component parts; each part is 
assigned a failure probability, and probabilities are 
combined into an overall probability for the entire process. 
Cuschieri & 
Tang Depend HRA 
Introduce levels of dependency between Human Factor 
Events (HFEs) in response to the linear, independent event 
framework of subjective, probabilistic HRAs. 
Cuschieri & 
Tang 
HRA based on 
Cognitive Control 
Theory 
Identify three situational factors (competence, control, 
constructs) that heavily influence error probability. 
Cuschieri & 
Tang* Competence 
The range of different actions that the system is capable of 
executing at a given time under situational conditions. 
Cuschieri & 
Tang* Control 
The quality of organization/orderliness with which 
competence is applied and executed. 
Cuschieri & 
Tang* Constructs 
Knowledge or assumptions about the situation within the 





Task is broken into subtasks; subtask error probabilities 






Focuses on whether an operator can realistically complete 





Rates the values of the factors that are thought to influence 
failure and success probabilities and they are then 
combined into a single rating. 
*As cited by Cuschieri & Tang, originally defined by Hollnagel, 2000 
 
THERP would be classified as a task-based analysis by Kim and Bishu (2006) and a subjective, 
probabilistic risk analysis by Cuschieri and Tang (2010). One limitation of THERP is that it was 
developed specifically for the nuclear power industry. Another is that it is complex and difficult 
for non-experts to use (Cuschieri & Tang, 2010). In fact, the guidance document for completing 
the THERP process is over 700 pages long (Swain & Guttmann, 1983). However, simpler 
versions have been created by the original theorists, including the Accident Sequence Evaluation 
Program (ASEP) and Simplified Human Error Analysis (SHEAN). 
Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
The Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) is another example of a task-
based analysis method.  The steps involved include the following: 
 (1) Categorize the process into one of nine generic categories. 
 (2) Identify all applicable Error Production Conditions. 
 (3) Evaluate the severity of the Error Producing Conditions. 
 (4) Combine the results of steps 1-3 into a final probability of error (Williams, 1985). 
Although still somewhat difficult to use, HEART is simpler than THERP and applies to a 
broader cross-section of industries. However, HEART still requires experience and knowledge to 
use properly. Additionally, Kim & Bishu (2006) have pointed out that HEART and other HRA 
methods that use probability estimates are fundamentally flawed due to the unpredictable and 
sometimes irrational actions that humans take. Kim & Bishu (2006), therefore, recommend a 
fuzzy math approach to HRA that eschews precise probabilities in favor of a range of probable 
outcomes. 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) 
The Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) is an example of an HRA 
methodology based on the Cognitive Control Theory identified and defined by Hollnagel (2000).  
The primary steps involved are to: 
(1) Build or develop a list of the cognitive demands of the task (see Table 2 for a list of 
the top cognitive demands). 
 (2) Identify the likely cognitive function failures. 
 (3) Determine the specific action failure probability. 
CREAM analysis focuses primarily on creating a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), 
but with human behavior/error rather than mechanical failure. 
 
Table 2: Cognitive Functions Used in the CREAM Methodology 
Cognitive 
Activity Definition 
Coordinate Bringing two or more activities or systems together to accomplish a shared objective. 
Communicate Receiving or sharing information required for task accomplishment via verbal, written, or electronic means. 
Compare Evaluating two or more entities with the intention of identifying similarities and differences between them. 
Diagnose Interpreting available information to formulate a theory regarding the cause of one or more problems. 
Evaluate Assessing a situation to determine the appropriate action(s) to take. 
Execute Carrying out a planned action. 
Identify Using existing information to create a theory regarding the nature of a particular object or situation. 
Maintain Taking necessary action(s) to keep a system at its current status. 
Monitor Continuously assessing the operational status of a system over an extended 
period of time. 
Observe Taking a single measurement of the operational status of a system. 
Plan Imagining a series of actions that, when carried out, will achieve a desired outcome. 
Record Creating a log of an event or events. 
Regulate Altering the condition(s) of a system in order to achieve an objective. 
Scan Getting a superficial overview of the system status in order to obtain a general impression. 
Verify Confirming the accuracy of the system status, whether by checking records or taking measurements/observations. 
 
Accident/Incident Investigation 
The influence of human error on accidents has been increasingly incorporated into investigation 
methods in recent years. While ‘Human Error’ may have been an acceptable root cause 
designation for an accident several decades ago, a deeper and more systematic assessment of 
human error has become necessary (Health and Safety Executive, 1999). This recent emphasis 
on human error has resulted in an expansion of knowledge related to human error and the most 
common human errors and other factors contributing to incidents.   
For example, Ion (2011) found that the most frequent errors among aircrews that led to incidents 
were loss of situational awareness, violation of rules and regulations, failure to follow safe 
procedures, poor judgment in decision-making, preoccupation with minor mechanical problems, 
and inadequate leadership. Ion (2011) also found that non-technical factors significantly 
contributed to accidents, including cognitive skills (planning, preparation, decision-making, 
awareness), interpersonal skills (communication, teamwork, leadership, conflict resolution), and 
emotional climate/stress.   
Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, Boquet, and Wiegmann (2007) also recount the results 
of a study in which six pilot-raters classified aircrew, supervisory, organizational, and 
environmental causal factors associated with 1020 commercial aviation accidents (181 air carrier 
aircraft and 839 commuter/on-demand aircraft) that occurred over a 13-year period to determine 
trends. Nearly 70% of accidents were associated with some manner of organizational, 
supervisory, or aircrew failure, although the percentages varied slightly when air carrier (45%) 
and commuter/on-demand (75%) aviation accidents were considered separately (Shappell et al., 
2007). Of these, the vast majority of the accidents were associated with aircrew factors. 
Multiple other researchers have also highlighted the importance of improving safety culture in 
reducing incidents (Cooper, 2001; Roughton & Mercurio, 2002; Mannan, Mentzer, & Zhang, 
2013). 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS; see Figure 2) was developed 
by Scott Shappell and Douglas Wiegmann in the early 2000s as an incident analysis method for 
the aviation industry 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000). 
HFACS synthesized the various 
human factors that had been 
found to contribute to incidents 
and organized them into a 
conceptual framework. HFACS 
was specifically developed as a 
way to “define the holes in the 
cheese” of Reason’s Swiss 
Cheese model (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2000, p. 70). It also 
allows data from multiple 
incidents to be aggregated in 
order to look for patterns and 
trends in incident causation. 
Essentially, the model allows 
incident investigators to find 
the similarities in a group of 
incidents that appear dissimilar at first glance, but that have specific categories of human error in 
common.  
HFACS categorizes errors into four levels: unsafe acts, preconditions, supervisory factors, and 
organizational influences (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2000). Within each level, there are multiple 
categories that are used to classify the various factors that contributed to each incident (see 
Figure 2).  
According to Dekker (2003), classification of human error may serve a practical purpose, as it 
can assist organizations in understanding and, therefore, managing human error. However, 
Dekker (2003) also argues that the process of classifying errors, in and of itself, does not provide 
deeper understanding of the incident. Additionally, a potential limitation of HFACS, specifically, 
is that there is no method to tie the contributing factors in an incident back to the operational 
procedures, processes, or programs of the individual organization. As a result, HFACS could 
provide a great deal of information regarding the errors that occur most frequently, but it does 
not guide the analyst toward the most efficient way to mitigate the risks associated with those 
human errors. 
Human Performance Reliability (HPR) 
HPR is a process developed by the author’s company that allows the analyst to associate 
individual controls (e.g., SOPs, programs, processes) to each human factor that contributed to an 
incident. HPR adapts the framework provided by HFACS (with revisions aimed at generalizing 
the method beyond the aviation industry) to conceptualize and classify human error and other 
contributing factors, but with the additional step of associating the control(s) that failed to 
prevent the incident from occurring. As more and more accident reviews are done, patterns and 




frequently in accident reviews. This process, as a data-driven method of accident/incident 
analysis, allows organizations to identify how and where to focus resources to drive safety 
performance improvements.   
What follows is a case study where the HPR process was used to review the significant accidents 
of a petroleum refining company.   
Method 
The authors were provided with detailed reports of approximately 30 significant safety or 
environmental incidents that occurred within a three-year period at two refineries owned by the 
refining company in this case study. These incidents included fires, product releases, power 
outages, injuries, and a single fatality. The HPR reviews focused on the information provided in 
the incident reports, as well as the SOPs, programs, and processes provided to the authors by the 
refining company and the individual refineries. 
The authors reviewed the incidents in accordance with the HPR process, classifying human 
errors that contributed to each incident and associating one or more failed controls with each 
identified error. In some cases, no control currently existed at the refineries to prevent the error 
in question. In those instances, the authors identified a control the refineries could implement to 
prevent similar errors in the future. For reasons of confidentiality, the specific details of the 
reviewed incidents cannot be reproduced in this paper. However, the errors and controls that 
most frequently contributed to incidents will be reviewed and discussed in the following 
sections. 
Results 
The data generated by the HPR review process are frequency counts of how often errors and 
controls were identified. The error frequencies were analyzed using a chi-square goodness-of-fit 
test and a post-hoc analysis of standard residuals for each error. The null hypothesis (i.e., that no 
error would contribute to incidents more frequently than others) was used to derive the 
theoretically expected value for the goodness-of-fit test. For each error type, the theoretically 
expected value was calculated by summing the total number of errors identified in that HFACS 
level (i.e., unsafe acts, preconditions, supervisory factors, organizational influences) and dividing 
by the number of questions in that level. These values were then compared to the observed error 
frequency. A partial contingency table illustrating this method can be found in Table 3. 
Table 3: Partial Contingency Table of Human Error Identified Frequencies 
Level 
Quest. 




Acts 1 Incorrectly assess situation 3.96 14 10.04 100.74 25.42 
Unsafe 
Acts 2 Failure to consult supervisor 3.96 7 3.04 9.22 2.33 
Unsafe 
Acts 3 
Experience or knowledge 
exceeded 3.96 6 2.04 4.15 1.05 
Unsafe 
Acts 4 
Unaware of changes in 
environment or conditions 3.96 6 2.04 4.15 1.05 
Unsafe 
Acts 5 
Failure to follow prescribed 
procedure 3.96 12 8.04 64.59 16.30 
Unsafe 
Acts 6 Use wrong procedure 3.96 1 -2.96 8.78 2.22 
Unsafe 
Acts 7 
Unaware of procedure or task 
changes 3.96 0 -3.96 15.71 3.96 
Unsafe 
Acts 8 Not paying attention 3.96 3 -0.96 0.93 0.23 
Unsafe 
Acts 9 Distracted by conditions 3.96 2 -1.96 3.85 0.97 
 
The chi-square statistic for n=125 (the number of error types) was Χ² = 528.58, which is 
significant at α = 0.01. Standard residuals were subsequently calculated and ranked in order of 
magnitude. A partial list can be found in Table 4. 
Table 4: Partial List of Standard Residuals, Ranked by Magnitude 
Level 
Quest. 
# Human Factors E O-E √E SR 
Preconditions 19 Leadership failure to guide 3.18 11.83 1.78 6.64 
Organizational 36 
Failure to identify and manage 
risks 4.73 13.27 2.18 6.10 
Supervisory 1 Failure of oversight 6.18 14.82 2.49 5.97 
Supervisory 7 
Failure to recognize unsafe 
conditions/practices 6.18 14.82 2.49 5.97 
Preconditions 10 Complacent 3.18 9.83 1.78 5.51 
Unsafe Acts 1 Incorrectly assess situation 3.96 10.04 1.99 5.04 
Preconditions 23 
Issues with processing 
equipment 3.18 8.83 1.78 4.95 
Unsafe Acts 5 
Failure to follow prescribed 
procedure 3.96 8.04 1.99 4.04 
Preconditions 15 
Trained inadequately on process 
or tasks 3.18 6.83 1.78 3.83 
Organizational 35 
Failure in 
communicate/implement 4.73 7.27 2.18 3.34 
Unsafe Acts 22 
Failure to properly prepare for 
job/task 3.96 6.04 1.99 3.03 
Preconditions 17 
Failure to 
communicate/coordinate 3.18 4.83 1.78 2.71 
Preconditions 39 
Inadequate info or work 
instructions 3.18 4.83 1.78 2.71 
Organizational 4 Training programs inadequate 4.73 5.27 2.18 2.42 
Preconditions 6 Failure to be job qualified 3.18 3.83 1.78 2.15 
Unsafe Acts 16 Use improper method 3.96 4.04 1.99 2.03 
Organizational 9 
Inadequate maintenance for 
process equipment 4.73 4.27 2.18 1.96 
 
Controls 
Since there was no limit to how many times a control could be identified in a review, unlike the 
error types, a statistical evaluation was not undertaken. Instead, partial lists of ranked frequencies 
are presented in Tables 5 and 6.   
Table 5: Frequency of Identified Controls  Table 6: Frequency of Identified Controls 
Location 1 – Controls Total  Location 2 - Controls Total 
*Missing* Responsibilities and Lines 
of Authority 
175  Responsibilities & Lines of 
Authority 
179 
*Missing* Management System – 
Training 
95  *Missing* Management System - 
Training 
118 
*Missing* Preventative Maintenance 92  Job Safety Analysis - Final  72 
*Missing* Mechanical Integrity 67  *Missing* Preventative 
Maintenance Procedure 
65 
Management of Change 65  MOC Approval Form 29 
Pre-Startup Safety Review 45  Lockout Tagout - Final Rev 22 
Job Safety Analysis 21  MOC Risk Screening Tool 21 
*Missing* Contractor Training on 
Hazard Recognition 
18  *Missing* Specific MOC Work 
Instructions 
16 
*Missing* Confined Space Entry 17  MOC Level A-B PHA-What If 15 
Lockout Tagout Procedure 14  Process Hazards Analysis 15 
 
Discussion 
The results of the reviews paint a picture of an organization that needs more involvement and 
leadership from management. The most commonly cited control that failed to prevent the 
incident(s) was ‘Responsibilities and Lines of Authority’, a document that defines the 
responsibilities of upper management at each facility. This was commonly cited as a control 
because either those managers’ actions were not in accordance with the document or there were 
activities or processes for which no one was formally responsible. Problematic programs, 
including management of change, mechanical integrity, lockout tagout, and training, were also 
identified.   
Lower on the list of controls were individual procedures that were identified as contributing 
factors. Often, simply knowing which controls to revise and understanding the human errors 
most often associated with those controls are sufficient for an organization to implement 
corrective action. However, organizations may benefit from further analysis, such as an HRA, on 
the identified procedures in certain instances. For example, if multiple human error types are 
associated with the control and the circumstances of the errors vary widely, further analysis 
might be appropriate. 
Last year, Novich, Weidner, and Armstrong (2014) presented a case study of the HPR process at 
a chemical company. In that deployment, chemical company representatives conducted the HPR 
reviews after receiving training from the author’s company. This is in contrast with the current 
case study, where the author’s company alone performed the HPR reviews based on accident 
investigation data gathered by the subject company. The 2014 deployment was successful at 
finding preliminary patterns in human error occurrence. However, two difficulties were noted 
during that deployment: (1) it was challenging to coordinate the schedules of company 
representatives to conduct HPR reviews, and (2) the team’s relative inexperience with the HPR 
process resulted, at times, in incomplete data, particularly regarding the controls associated with 
human error. The method of the current case study was designed to alleviate these difficulties by 
having a smaller team of HPR and PSM/Occupational Safety experts perform the reviews. 
In the broader context of human error and occupational accidents and incidents, the methodology 
presented in this paper serves as a process to identify the human error types and the controls 
most frequently associated with an organization’s incidents. From there, the organization can 
immediately identify local improvement efforts, evaluate aggregated data for systemic 
improvement opportunities, and/or determine the particular processes (if any) that may benefit 
from further analysis. 
Limitations 
While the HPR process appears to be an effective method for identifying human error types and 
controls in this case study, further replication would provide even stronger evidence of its utility.  
An additional limitation of this study is that the author’s sole evaluation of the organization was 
incident data. Evaluating an organization’s safety performance by only reviewing it at its worst 
could present a pessimistic and overly negative view of the organization’s true safety 
performance or abilities. Additionally, the accident investigation results that were presented to 
the authors were not completed with the HPR review process in mind. As a result, there were 
instances where the information was insufficient to definitively state that a particular human 
error contributed to a certain incident.   
Finally, while the authors have considerable expertise in applying the HPR process, they had 
limited knowledge of the characteristics of the refineries in question, including their culture, 
unwritten practices, employee engagement, and leadership effectiveness of supervisors and 
managers. This is in contrast to the aforementioned study (Novich, Weidner, & Armstrong, 
2014), where the organization’s review team had limited HPR experience but extensive 
knowledge and experience in company practices. The current case study appeared to generate 
more valid data, particularly regarding the controls associated with error, than the previous case 
study. Combining the strengths of these two methods may involve having HPR experts conduct a 
sampling of HPR reviews at the outset of a project, then turning the process over to organization 
personnel (after thorough training in the HPR process). Future empirical testing of this method 
will be needed to show whether it is superior to either of the case studies already presented. 
Conclusion 
The concept of human error and its contribution to occupational accidents and incidents has 
received considerable research attention in recent years. When an accident/incident occurs, 
investigation and analysis of the human error that led to the incident often reveals vulnerabilities 
in an organization’s management system. There are many types of HRA, including THERP, 
HEART, and CREAM, that are designed to determine the relative probability that a human error 
will occur during a certain process. Unfortunately, many of these HRA methods are time-
consuming to administer, require extensive expertise, and do not offer guidance on which 
processes to select for review.   
This recent emphasis on human error has resulted in an expansion of knowledge related to 
human error and the most common factors contributing to incidents. HFACS, in particular, 
allows data from multiple incidents to be aggregated to discover patterns and trends in incident 
causation. HPR, a process developed by the author’s company, adapts the framework provided 
by HFACS to further conceptualize and classify human error, but with the additional step of 
associating the control(s) that failed to prevent the incident from occurring. This process allows 
organizations to identify how and where to focus resources to drive safety performance 
improvements.   
When the author applied HPR to two refineries at a petroleum refining company, the results 
uncovered an organization in need of more senior management involvement and leadership. 
Problematic programs, including management of change, mechanical integrity, lockout tagout, 
and training, were also identified. 
The HPR methodology, while not without limitations, serves as a process to identify the human 
error types and the controls most frequently associated with an organization’s incidents. This 
enables to organization to identify local improvement efforts, evaluate aggregated data for 
systemic improvement opportunities, and/or determine the particular processes that may benefit 
from further analysis. The evaluation of HPR as an effective analysis tool are ongoing, but early 
results suggest it may help companies understand human error within their organizations. 
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